Why the fighters did not stop the planes

Before 9/11, NORAD’s northeast sector, NEADS, had four fighters on alert for the whole region: two at Otis on Cape Cod and two at Langley in Virginia. Hijackings were expected to be traditional ones, with time to react; NORAD’s exercises imagined threats coming from outside the country. [1]

Boston Center called NEADS about American 11 at 8:37:52, nine minutes before it hit the North Tower. That was, the Commission found, “the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.” The military learned of United 175 as it hit the South Tower; was told only that American 77 was lost, at 9:34, minutes before it hit the Pentagon; and heard of United 93 after it had crashed. [1][2]

At 9:21 the FAA wrongly reported that American 11 was still airborne and heading south. NEADS scrambled the Langley fighters to meet it; a generic flight plan sent them east over the Atlantic. [1]

The theory, popularized by Loose Change and others, is that interceptions were routine before 9/11 and could only have failed by design. [3]

The NEADS tapes, first obtained by the Commission by subpoena and later published by Vanity Fair, show the opposite of a stand-down: officers scrambling for information, asking “Is this real-world or exercise?” because a NORAD-wide training exercise was planned that morning, and chasing planes that had already crashed or never existed. [1][2]

In May 2003 NORAD officials testified that NEADS was told about United 93 at 9:16 and about American 77 at 9:24, and that the Langley fighters went up to meet them. Commission staff found all three statements were wrong: there was no hijacking to report at 9:16, the 9:24 notice was about the phantom American 11, and NEADS never got hijack notice for American 77. [1]

The effect, the Commission said, was to make it look as if the military had time to respond to two of the hijackings. [3] Some Commission members and staff suspected the misstatements were deliberate. They considered referring the matter to the Justice Department and sent it instead to the Defense and Transportation inspectors general. [2]

On 9/11 NORAD had a large exercise scheduled, Vigilant Guardian. According to the Commission, it postulated a bomber attack from the former Soviet Union. That is why, when Boston Center called at 8:37:52, the first question from the NEADS floor was “Is this real-world or exercise?” The answer was immediate: “No, this is not an exercise, not a test.” [1][2]

The theory is that the exercise was cover: radar screens cluttered with fake tracks and fighters sent the wrong way, so that the real planes got through. The Commission investigated exactly that. NORAD’s commander, General Ralph Eberhart, testified that “it took about 30 seconds” to switch to the real situation, and the Commission concluded the response was, if anything, expedited because more staff were on duty for the exercise. [1]

The tapes do not show anyone confusing a simulated track with a real hijacking for long. They show a bigger problem: the system had been built and drilled for threats from outside the country, and the hijackers were inside it, with transponders off, minutes from their targets. [2][3]

A second drill adds to the eerie feeling. The National Reconnaissance Office, which runs many of the country’s spy satellites from Chantilly, Virginia, a few miles from Dulles Airport, had planned an exercise that morning in which a small corporate jet would suffer a mechanical failure and crash into one of its buildings. No plane was involved: stairwells were to be closed so staff had to find other ways out. The agency told the Associated Press the scenario had been planned for months, involved no terrorism, and was cancelled “as soon as the real world events began.” Its spokesman called it “an incredible coincidence.” [4]