Before 9/11, NORAD’s northeast sector, NEADS, had four fighters on alert for the whole region: two at Otis on Cape Cod and two at Langley in Virginia. Hijackings were expected to be traditional ones, with time to react; NORAD’s exercises imagined threats coming from outside the country. [1]
Boston Center called NEADS about American 11 at 8:37:52, nine minutes before it hit the North Tower. That was, the Commission found, “the most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.” The military learned of United 175 as it hit the South Tower; was told only that American 77 was lost, at 9:34, minutes before it hit the Pentagon; and heard of United 93 after it had crashed. [1][2]
At 9:21 the FAA wrongly reported that American 11 was still airborne and heading south. NEADS scrambled the Langley fighters to meet it; a generic flight plan sent them east over the Atlantic. [1]
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