What the intelligence said before and after the war.
The Senate Intelligence Committee’s 2006 postwar report concluded that postwar information supported prewar assessments “that there was no credible information that Iraq was complicit in or had foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks or any other al-Qa’ida strike.” It found Saddam Hussein “distrustful of al-Qa’ida” and that he refused its requests for help. [1]
The most cited lead was a Czech report that Mohamed Atta met the Iraqi intelligence officer Ahmed al-Ani in Prague in 2001. The committee found postwar evidence confirmed “no such meeting occurred”; al-Ani said he had never heard of Atta until after 9/11. [1] The 9/11 Commission had also doubted it. [2]
In September 2003 President Bush said, “We’ve had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with the September 11th,” while maintaining Saddam had al Qaeda ties. [3] Weeks earlier, a poll found 69% of Americans thought it likely Saddam was personally involved. [4]
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