COMPLETE STATIC READING EDITION

The 28 pages

The secret chapter of Congress’s 9/11 inquiry, and what it did and did not show about Saudi Arabia

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What the pages said

Leads, in the inquiry’s own words.

The chapter’s opening finding: “some of the September 11 hijackers, while in the United States, apparently had contacts with individuals who may be connected to the Saudi Government.” It adds that the inquiry “did not attempt to investigate and assess the accuracy and significance of this information independently,” and handed the matter to the agencies. [1]

Its main names were Omar al-Bayoumi, who FBI reports going back to 1999 said might be a Saudi intelligence officer and who gave the hijackers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar “substantial assistance” in San Diego; Osama Bassnan, who the pages say, with his wife, received financial support from the Saudi ambassador and his wife; and Fahad al-Thumairy, an accredited Saudi diplomat and imam in Los Angeles. The pages also note that Bayoumi drew a monthly salary from a Saudi company tied to the Ministry of Defense. [1]

One detail people still quote: a phone book belonging to the captured al Qaeda figure Abu Zubaydah held a number linked to a Colorado company that managed the home of Prince Bandar, then the Saudi ambassador. A November 2002 FBI response recorded in the pages says “CIA traces have revealed no direct links between numbers found in Zubaida’s phone book and numbers in the United States.” [1]

What we can’t tell you. Some lines are still redacted.

The sources

  1. Joint Inquiry, Part Four (“the 28 pages”), as declassified in 2016 ↗

    The scanned pages themselves, on possible Saudi government support for the hijackers. Image-only PDF; it opens but has no text layer.

  2. House Intelligence Committee, 15 July 2016: declassified “28 pages” ↗

    The release of Part Four with an FBI–CIA executive summary arguing that later investigation did not support most of its leads.

How Congress read it in 2016

Both parties’ intelligence leaders played it down.

On release, the Republican committee chairman Devin Nunes said the chapter “does not put forward vetted conclusions, but rather unverified leads that were later fully investigated.” The top Democrat, Adam Schiff, said the intelligence community and the 9/11 Commission had been “never able to find sufficient evidence” to back the leads up. [1]

Their reference point was the Commission’s 2004 finding that there was “no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization.” The Commission added a qualifier that is often left out: Saudi Arabia was a place where al Qaeda raised money, and charities with Saudi government sponsorship might have diverted funds to it. [2]

What we can’t tell you. Statements by committee leaders are interpretations, not new findings.

The sources

  1. House Intelligence Committee, 15 July 2016: declassified “28 pages” ↗

    The release of Part Four with an FBI–CIA executive summary arguing that later investigation did not support most of its leads.

  2. 9/11 Commission Report, chapter 5: Al Qaeda Aims at the American Homeland ↗

    KSM’s planes operation, the selection of the hijackers, financing, and the finding of no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior officials individually funded al Qaeda.

Why it did not end there

The leads became a lawsuit.

The 28 pages were the start, not the end. After President Biden ordered a declassification review in 2021, the FBI released files that went much further on Bayoumi, including a 2017 memo saying he had been a paid Saudi intelligence asset. [1][2] In 2025 a federal judge ruled the families’ suit against Saudi Arabia could go ahead. [3] See the Bayoumi file and the lawsuit.

What we can’t tell you. Most of the newer evidence is disputed by Saudi Arabia and has not been tested at trial.

The sources

  1. Federal Register: Executive Order 14040, 3 September 2021 ↗

    President Biden’s order for a six-month declassification review of FBI 9/11 records.

  2. FBI electronic communication, 14 June 2017, “Albayoumi / GIP Cooptee,” filed as ECF 8871-4 in In re Terrorist Attacks (S.D.N.Y.) ↗

    States that Bayoumi was paid a monthly stipend as a cooptee of Saudi intelligence and that this “confirms” allegations the 9/11 Commission had not confirmed.

  3. U.S. District Court (S.D.N.Y.), 28 August 2025: memorandum decision and order denying Saudi Arabia’s motion to dismiss (ECF 11182) ↗

    Judge George Daniels lets the families’ claims against Saudi Arabia proceed under JASTA. Image-only PDF.

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