The planes operation

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, known as KSM, grew up in Kuwait in a Pakistani Baluch family and studied engineering in North Carolina. He helped fund his nephew Ramzi Yousef’s 1993 truck bomb under the World Trade Center, and in 1994–95 worked with Yousef in Manila on the Bojinka plot to blow up airliners over the Pacific. [1][2]

In mid-1996 he met bin Laden at Tora Bora and proposed several schemes. One was to train pilots to fly planes into buildings in the United States. At first he envisioned ten planes and targets on both coasts, with himself landing the last to make a speech. Bin Laden thought that too much. He gave the go-ahead to a smaller version in late 1998 or early 1999. [1]

The Commission called KSM “the principal architect of the 9/11 attacks.” Its staff noted that much of what it knew about the plot’s planning came from KSM and other detainees, through intelligence reports it was not allowed to check by questioning them. [1][3]

Commission staff estimated the plot cost al Qaeda $400,000 to $500,000, of which about $300,000 passed through the hijackers’ US bank accounts. The money arrived by wire transfer from the United Arab Emirates, in cash and traveler’s checks carried in, and through foreign accounts reached from ATMs and credit cards in the United States. [1]

Most came through KSM and two facilitators in the UAE, Ali Abdul Aziz Ali (his nephew) and Mustafa al-Hawsawi. Days before the attack the hijackers sent about $26,000 they had not spent back to the UAE. [1][2]

The staff found “no credible evidence that any person in the United States gave the hijackers substantial financial assistance,” and “no evidence that any foreign government — or foreign government official — supplied any funding.” That finding is the starting point for the arguments in the 28 pages and the Bayoumi file, which are about help with housing and logistics, not about the plot’s budget. [2][3]

The targets discussed before Atta left Afghanistan in early 2000 were the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White House and the Capitol. According to Binalshibh, bin Laden preferred the White House and passed that message to Atta more than once; the final choice was left open into the summer of 2001. [1][2]

The Commission concluded that United 93’s target was “either the Capitol or the White House.” It turned toward Washington before the passengers fought back. [3] What happened on board is in the Flight 93 file.