What the CIA knew about two hijackers

The Commission listed ten “operational opportunities” that were missed. The first five are about the CIA: not watchlisting Mihdhar or telling the FBI in January 2000 that he had a U.S. visa; not tracking him and his associates onward; not watchlisting Hazmi or telling the FBI in March 2000 that he had flown to Los Angeles; not telling the FBI in January 2001 that a source had put the USS Cole plotter Khallad at the Malaysia meeting; and not passing any of this on in May 2001 when an official reviewed it. [1]

The Justice Department inspector general found an FBI agent assigned to the CIA had drafted a report for the FBI on Mihdhar’s visa in January 2000. Hours later a CIA desk officer added the note: “pls hold off on CIR for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit].” The report was never sent. Everyone involved said they did not recall it, and the inspector general “was unable to determine why it was not sent,” calling it “a significant failure.” [2]

The two men lived openly in San Diego, including in a room rented from an FBI informant. The INS told the FBI on 22 August 2001 that both had entered the country, and Mihdhar again on 4 July. The search began too late. [2][3]

In a 2021 declaration for the defense in the military commissions case, investigator Donald Canestraro summarized interviews with former FBI officials. One, called CS-3, said CIA analysts working through Saudi intelligence were trying to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar. Another, CS-16, a former senior FBI official, said the CIA withheld the information on the orders of two CIA employees, Richard Blee and Tom Wilshire, and gave the opinion that it was because the CIA hoped to recruit them as sources. [1]

These are secondhand accounts, given years later, and they are opinions about motive. The inspector general found no documents explaining the hold, and the CIA officers said they could not remember. [2] No released document supports the theory.